



The Study of EU-Canada FTA: The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement(CETA)

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
Analytical approach

- Two-Level Games
- Asymmetric Negotiation theory
- Case studies: Geographical Indications
Copyright

Research Questions


1. What domestic and international restricts did both governments encounter and how did they respond to them?
2. How did “power” affect the negotiation?
How did Canada overcome power weakness and strive for its national interest in the negotiation?

Two-Level Games



Resources: The original model was from Moravcsik's article "Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining," and modified by the author


Geographical Indications- Two-Level Games



- Results of the negotiation → Canada accepts the EU's GIs protection system

Copyright- Two-Level Games

- EU's demand → copyright term extension, enhanced protections for broadcaster, strict liability rules for ISΓ






- Results of the negotiation → Canada reject EU's

Conclusion: Two-Level Games




Asymmetric negotiation

- Aggregate Power
- Issue-Specific Power
 - Alternative
 - Commitment
 - Control
- Behavioral Power

Geographical Indications- Asymmetric negotiation theory

	EU	Canada
Alternative	No alternative	No alternative
Commitment	Stronger 	Weaker
Control	Stronger 	Weaker
Issue power	Stronger 	Weaker

Copyright- Asymmetric negotiation

	EU	Canada
Alternative	No alternative	No alternative
Commitment	Weaker	Stronger 
Control	Weaker	Stronger 
Issue power	Weaker	Stronger 

Conclusion

	Geographical Indications	Copyright
Aggregate power (stronger)	EU	EU
Issue power (stronger)	EU	Canada
Canada's strategy	Cutting slack, issue linkage → Domestic level	Cutting slack, reverberation → International level
Negotiation results	EU wins	Canada wins